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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. WHETHER THE PRESIDENT MAY, ABSENT MEANING-
FUL CONSULTATION WITH AND GENUINE APPROVAL 
BY CONGRESS, ORDER UNITED STATES ARMED 
FORCES TO MAKE WAR. 
2. WHETHER NONJUSTICIABILITY DOCTRINES BAR A 
FEDERAL COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM DE-
CIDING THE ABOVE QUESTION. 
INTEREST OF AMICI 
The current situation in the Persian Gulf raises grave legal 
questions of pressing concern to all Americans. Amici curiae, the 
law professors named below, have lectured and published widely 
on the subjects of constitutional law or the law of United States 
foreign relations. This amicus memorandum sets forth their con-
sidered views on two constitutional questions raised by the cur-
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rent controversy. It speaks solely to these matters of 
constitutional principle, not to the morality or political wisdom of 
any executed or contemplated governmental action. Amici sign 
this memorandum on their own behalf and not as representatives 
of their respective schools. The affiliations and qualifications of 
amici are as follows: 
Bruce A. Ackerman is Sterling Professor of Law and Political 
Science at Yale University and author, inter alia, of We The People 
(forthcoming Harvard University Press). 
Abram Chayes is Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at 
Harvard University, former Legal Adviser to the United States 
Department of State, and author, inter alia, of The Cuban Missile 
Crisis: International Crisis and the Role of Law, and International Legal 
Process (co-author with T. Ehrlich and A. Lowenfeld). 
Lori Fisler Damrosch is Professor of Law at Columbia Univer-
sity and author, inter alia, of Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 
Va. L. Rev. 483 (1987), and of a forthcoming casebook on For-
eign Affairs and the Constitution (co-author with L. Henkin). 
John Hart Ely is Robert E. Paradise Professor of Law and for-
mer Dean of the Law School at Stanford University and author, 
inter alia, of Democracy and Distrust; The American War in Indochina 
(Parts I & II), 42 Stan. L. Rev. 877, 1092 (1990); and Suppose Con-
gress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1379 
(1988). 
Erwin N. Griswold is former Dean and Langdell Professor of 
Law at Harvard University and former Solicitor General of the 
United States. 
Gerald Gunther is William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law 
at Stanford University and author, inter alia, of Constitutional Law 
(11th ed.). 
Louis Henkin is University Professor Emeritus and Special 
Service Professor at Columbia University, formerly Chief Re-
porter of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States, and author, inter alia, of Foreign Affairs and the Constitu-
tion; Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs; a forthcoming 
casebook on Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (co-author with 
L. Damrosch); and Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 Yale 
LJ. 597 (1976). 
Harold Hongju Koh is Professor of Law at Yale University 
and author, inter alia, of The National Security Constitution: Sharing 
Power After the Iran-Contra Affair. 
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Philip B. Kurland is William R. Kenan, Jr. Distinguished Ser-
vice Professor at the University of Chicago and author, inter alia, 
of The Founders' Constitution (co-author with R. Lerner). 
Laurence H. Tribe is RalphS. Tyler,Jr. Professor of Constitu-
tional Law at Harvard University and author, inter alia, of American 
Constitutional Law (2d ed.); Constitutional Choices; and On Reading the 
Constitution (forthcoming Harvard University Press). 
William W. Van Alstyne is the William & Thomas Perkins Pro-
fessor of Law at Duke University and author, inter alia, of Congress, 
the President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1972). 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE PRESIDENT MAY NOT, ABSENT MEANINGFUL 
CONSULTATION WITH AND GENUINE APPROVAL 
BY CONGRESS, ORDER UNITED STATES 
ARMED FORCES TO MAKE WAR. 
Article I, § 8, d. 11 of the United States Constitution states 
that "Congress shall have Power ... [t]o declare War." Although 
Article II, § 2, d. 1 names the President "Commander in Chief of 
the Army and Navy," the President may not invoke that authority 
to make war without consulting with and gaining the genuine ap-
proval of Congress. 
The structure and history of our Constitution compel this 
sharing of responsibility. Like other presidential powers, execu-
tive power to conduct military action remains subject to the 
checks and balances vested by the Constitution in Congress and 
the courts. "This system," in James Wilson's words, "will not 
hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not 
be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to in-
volve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring 
war is vested in the legislature at large .... " 2 The Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 528 
(J. Elliot ed. 1888). Nor, as Justice Black's opinion for the Court 
suggested in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
587-88 (1952), did the Framers vest a general warmaking author-
ity in the President by using the words "executive Power" in Arti-
cle II, § 1, d. 1. 1 During the Constitutional Convention, the 
I See also Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and Abrogation of 
Treaties-The Original Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 Wash. 
L. Rev. 1, 30-46, 79-82, 87-91 (1979). 
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Framers did rephrase Congress' power to "make" war as an au-
thority to "declare war." 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 
1787, at 318-19 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937). That rewording 
served not to transfer unilateral warmaking authority to the Pres-
ident, however,· but only to clarify his constitutional latitude to 
repel sudden attacks against the United States without a formal 
declaration of war.2 
In his famous concurrence in Youngstown, Justice Jackson pos-
ited that: 
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or im-
plied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its max-
imum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right 
plus all that Congress can delegate .... 
2. When the President acts in the absence of either a 
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely 
·upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of 
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent 
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain .... 
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with 
the expressed or implied will ofCongress, his power is at 
its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own con-
stitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presi-
dential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from 
acting upon the subject. 
343 U.S. 579, 635-638 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
This analysis "summarize[s] the pragmatic, flexible view of 
differentiated gpvemmental power to which we are heir."3 In the 
present situation, Justice Jackson's reasoning requires a court to 
determine whether the· presidential conduct in question falls 
. . ' ' 
2 See A. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The Origins 32 (1976) 
("nothing in the change signifies an intent to allow the President a general authority to 
'make' war in the absence of a declaration"); L. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers' Con-
stitution 37 (1988). This memorandum addresses only the President's power to make 
war, not his authority to use force to repel sudden attacks upon United States territory 
or armed forces. 
3 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989). The full Court has repeatedly 
endorsed Justice Jackson's reasoning in separation-of-powers cases. See, e.g., Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986); Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (Justice Jackson's concurrence "brings to-
gether as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area"); 
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (in United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974), "the unanimous Court essentially embraced Mr. Justice Jack-
son's view, expressed in his concurrence in Youngstown ... "). 
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within the exclusive scope of the President's Commander-in-
Chief power. In analyzing this claim, the court should recall that 
the power to decide for war falls within the scope of legislative, 
not executive, authority. Any claim of presidential authority to 
act unilaterally as Commander-in-Chief, "at once so conclusive 
and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at 
stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional sys-
tem." !d. at 638. If the President claims to act under delegated 
authority, the court must carefully examine public expressions of 
congressional will to determine whether those expressions mani-
fest genuine approval for presidential action.4 
The Constitution specifies that Congress shall publicly mani-
fest its approval for a determination to make war via a formal 
declaration of war. U.S. Const. art. I,§ 8, d. 11. We do not read 
that clause as rigidly stipulating the only political mechanism 
whereby Congress may meaningfully manifest its understanding 
and approval. 5 We do, however, understand the structure and 
history of the Constitution to require that the President meaning-
fully consult with Congress and receive its affirmative authoriza-
tion-not merely present it with faits accomplis-before engaging 
in war. We further believe that Congress must manifest its genu-
ine approval through formal action, not legislative silence, stray 
remarks of individual Members, or collateral legislative activity 
that the President or a court might construe to constitute "acqui-
escence" in executive acts. 
In Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967), Justice Stewart, 
joined by Justice Douglas, dissented from denial of certiorari to 
4 This court should not avoid Youngstown's reasoning by invoking sweeping dicta 
from United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The Court has never 
suggested-before, after, or in Curtiss-Wright itself-that the President's "very delicate, 
plenary and exclusive power ... as the sole organ of the federal government in the field 
of international relations," id. at 320, included a general power to make war. As Justice 
Jackson later recognized, Curtiss-Wright "involved, not the question of the President's 
power to act without congressional authority, but the question of his right to act under 
and in accord with an Act of Congress." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 635-36 n.2 (1952) Uackson, J., concurring). Moreover, numerous commentators 
have exposed deep flaws in Curtiss-Wright's reasoning. See, e.g., Levitan, The Foreign Rela-
tions Power: An Analysis of Mr. justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 Yale LJ. 467, 493 ( 1946); Ber-
ger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 Mich. L. Rev. I, 26-33 ( 1972); 
Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright1, 
13 Yalej. lnt'l L. 5, 12-17 (1988); LaFeber, The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy: 
An Interpretation, 74 J. Am. Hist. 695, 710-714 (1987); Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 Yale LJ. I (1973). 
5 Cf U.S. Const. art. I,§ 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution ... all . . . Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States .... "). 
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three draftees' petition requesting injunctive and declaratory re-
lief against allegedly illegal U.S. military activity in Vietnam. jus-
tice Stewart identified the following "questions of great 
magnitude" raised· by the petition: 
I. Is the ·present United States military activity . . . a 
"war" within the meaning of Article I, Section 8, Clause 
11, of the Constitution? 
II. If so, may the Executive constitutionally order the pe-
titioners to participate in that military activity, when no 
war has been declared by the Congress? 
III. Of what relevance to Question II are the present 
treaty obligations of the United States? 
IV. Of what relevance to Question II is [any] joint Con-
gressional . . . Resolution [passed with regard to such 
activity]? 
(a) Do present United States military operations 
fall within the terms of the joint Resolution? 
(b) If the Joint Resolution purports to give the 
Chief ·Executive authority to commit United States 
forces to armed conflict limited in scope only by his 
own absolute discretion, is the Resolution a constitu-
tionally impermissible delegation of all or part of 
Congress' power to declare war? 
!d. at 934-35. 
Amici submit that the current situation in the Persian Gulf also 
implicates these questions and that this court should analyze 
those issues before it in accordance with the constitutional princi-
ples stated above. 
2. THE LEGAL QUESTIONS RAISED ABOVE ARE 
JUSTICIABLE AND IN AN APPROPRIATE CASE, 
A FEDERAL COURT MAY DECIDE THEM. 
The parties before the court bear responsibility for address-
ing the justiciability of the specific legal claims raised here. Amici 
urge the court, however, to view those specific claims against a 
broad principle: that questions regarding the scope of Congress' 
power to declare war and the President's power as Commander-
in-Chief are not, by their nature, inherently unfit for judicial res-
olution. 6 In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211, 217 (1962), the 
Supreme Court called it "error to suppose that every case or con-
6 Amici take no position on the plaintiffs' standing to bring their claims. 
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troversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cog-
nizance," arguing that the nonjusticiability doctrine is "one of 
'political questions,' not one of 'political cases.' " That statement 
rested on a recognition that, since the beginning of the Republic, 
federal judges have reviewed the legality of military seizures, re-
taliatory strikes, and covert actions ordered under claims of dele-
gated and inherent presidential power to conduct warfare.7 
Those cases that have reviewed and sustained presidential orders 
of military action plainly rebut any claims that such actions are 
somehow immune from judicial scrutiny.8 
More recently, the Supreme Court has announced that 
"[r]esolution oflitigation challenging the constitutional authority 
of the one of the three branches cannot be evaded by courts be-
cause the issues have political implications .... " INS v. Chadha, 
462 U.S. 919,943 (1983). Questions ofinterpretation oftreaties, 
executive agreements, and customary international law have long 
been heldjusticiable.9 Nor can a court evade interpretation of an 
Act of Congress-whether the War Powers Resolution of 1973, 
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1982), or any subsequent joint resolu-
tion-simply because the legality of presidential warmaking may 
be called into question. As the Court recently declared, "under 
the Constitution, one of the Judiciary's characteristic roles is to 
interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely 
because our decision may have significant political overtones.'' 
japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 
(1986). Finally, in times of actual and threatened hostilities, the 
courts bear a special responsibility to scrutinize government con-
duct that allegedly infringes individual rights. 10 
Prudential factors do not invariably weigh against judicial res-
7 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Brown v. United States, 12 
U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) I (1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 
U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806). See 
generally Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 Yale 
LJ. 672, 701 (1972). 
8 See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666-71 (1862); Martin v. Molt, 25 
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827). Cf United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 
304 (1936) (reviewing and sustaining presidential action on the merits, relying on au-
thority delegated from Congress). 
9 See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji America v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (construing 
treaty); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (construing executive agreement); 
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (construing customary international" law). 
to See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Even the 
Supreme Court's thoroughly discredited decision in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214 (1944), reviewed on the merits the wartime governmental conduct challenged there. 
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olution of warmaking questions. II If anything, meaningful judi-
cial review is even more constitutionally necessary in the current 
situation than in traditional domestic cases. · Through the 
Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2, the Framers largely 
removed the states as a political check against executive action in 
foreign affairs. Precisely because federal judges enjoy life tenure 
and salary independence, they have both the power and a special 
obligation to say what the law is in warmaking cases, which invari-
ably implicate controversial legal issues and affect private inter-
ests. Such cases raise "large and deeply troubling [substantive] 
questions" and require "the resolution of serious preliminary is-
sues of justiciability." Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 935 
(1967) (Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari). This court bears a grave constitutional duty to de-
cide these questions carefully and systematically, and only after 
full briefing and oral argument. 
II See, e.g., Redish,judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1031, 
1045-55 (1985); Tigar,Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 
17 UCLA L. Rev. 1135 (1970). 
